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SIMULATION EXERCISE

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**Towards a solution for the conflict and
humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic**

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INTRODUCTION

The Central African Republic (CAR) has been subjected to a long and turbulent history of violence. The current conflict started at the time President Michel Djotodia took power (March-April 2013). Djotodia, the first Muslim in office in a country of a Christian majority, did not prevent a widespread outbreak of brutalities. Observers referred to the situation as a “genocide in the making” and the continued fighting between local Séléka rebels and the anti-Balaka rebels found the country on the verge of civil war.¹

The **Séléka** (meaning “alliance” in the Sango language) coalition is an alliance of an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 ex-soldiers and militiamen belonging to rebel groups. These rebel groups signed the 2008 peace agreements that ended the Central African Republic Bush War (2004-2007), but have now re-entered the conflict. Séléka are mainly based in the North of the country and most of its members are Muslim.

The Séléka coalition was established in August 2012 to oppose the government of François Bozizé, for not respecting the 2008 peace agreements and cease-fire. Bozizé had taken power by military coup in 2003. Unsuccessful attempts by the Séléka coalition requesting him to resign were followed by the seizure of key towns and cities, resulting in unrest and panic amongst citizens.

François Bozizé was ousted in March 2013 and subsequently fled the country. President Djotodia took power by a military coup and installed himself as the President of the CAR. His inability to control the continuous violence perpetrated by the Séléka rebels, resulted in attempts by Djotodia to break up the Séléka coalition. In statements he declared that he would not tolerate lawlessness and the existence of rebel forces. However, the tide of violence could not be stemmed: militia continued to operate in an ever-growing geographical area and crimes against humanity have been repeatedly committed. The CAR army, on its part, remains disorganized and poorly trained and has never been adept in bringing a halt to the fighting. Since December 2012, citizens of the CAR have been confronted with persistent raids, kidnappings and killings. As a reaction to the attacks and violence exercised by the Séléka, **the anti-Balaka** coalition emerged in August 2013. Supposedly, the anti-Balaka was created by François Bozizé to face the violence caused by the Séléka.

Two rebel groups

It is not exactly clear who makes up **Séléka**’s membership. CCN journalist Jason Warner distinguishes between official and unofficial Séléka membership: “Officially, Séléka is the title given to the broader alliance of smaller groups – some a decade old, others having emerged just months ago – that have qualms with Bozizé’s government. [...] The three rebel

¹ SMITH, I. L., (2014). Conflict Prevention in the Central African Republic: Making Genocide Prevention Work. *African Security Review*, 23(2), p. 179.; MBATHA, D., & GUY, S., *UN AND AFRICA: Warning Signs of Genocide in CAR*, United Nations Radio, 13.03.2014 (Radiobroadcast).

groups – The Patriots’ Convention for Justice and Peace (CPJP), The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), and The Democratic Front of Central African People (FDPC) – have all allied themselves in opposition to the Bozizé regime. Unofficially, however, observers believe that a much more diverse cast of characters constitutes Séléka’s core. Government officials from Bangui have accused Séléka of harbouring “foreign provocateurs” greedy for the country’s vast mineral wealth, and there are suspicions that nationals from Chad, Nigeria, and Sudan also make up Séléka’s ranks. Others have noted that rather than being a simple revolt by CAR’s civil society, money to pay Séléka’s soldiers may originate from the same sources that funded the Malian, Libyan, and Tunisian revolts: amongst others, this would imply Chad and possibly al Qaeda.”² Séléka used guerrilla tactics to target government troops.



Map 1

Map 1 shows the towns controlled by Séléka and attack routes used in March 2013.³

The **anti-Balaka** (Balaka means machete, while anti-Balaka means invincible) is an umbrella term for the various groups engaged in violent reactions against the Séléka rebels. It consists

of soldiers who served under Bozizé in the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), minors and youth without an educational background (of which some are younger than 10 years old), the Association of Central African Farmers (ACP), an anti-Séléka peasant movement, as well as the Front for the Return to the Constitutional Order in Central Africa (FROCCA). Members of the anti-Balaka are mainly Christian who come from the South of the country. In contrast, Séléka rebels are mainly Muslim originating from the North of the CAR. It is estimated that anti-Balaka includes 72 000 fighters of which 10 to 15 percent used to be part of the military. Members of the former national army, the ‘*Forces Armées Centrafricaines*’ (FACA), have also joined anti-Balaka groups. This allowed the group to acquire military skills, become more organised and obtain military weaponry. Their main goal is to regain control over CAR’s capital city, Bangui. However, their actions have caused the UN’s refugee agency to

² WARNER, J., *Who Are Seleka?*, CNN, 2013. (24.09.2014., CNN, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/17/who-are-seleka/>).


³ CENTANNI, E., *Central African Republic: Map of Rebel Advance to Capital*, 2014. (23.03.2013., Political Geography Now, <http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/03/central-african-republic-rebellion-map.html>).

express fear for the lives of thousands of Muslims who are at risk of getting ‘slaughtered’ by the Christian militia.

The Séléka coalition has been dissolved under President Djotodia. However, this has not precluded ex-Séléka to reorganize. In statements, it was announced that a new military structure would be created to fight the ongoing violence committed by the Anti-Balaka. On its turn, this was perceived as a provocation and an attempt to divide the country. The ongoing situation has subjected the CAR to a severe humanitarian crisis.

COUNTRY PROFILE

The CAR is a landlocked country in the middle of the African continent. Its neighbouring countries include: Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, The Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic Congo and Cameroon. In what follows, the demographic, economic and political situation will be further explained and its current sectarian division commented upon.



Map 2

Demographic situation




Figure 1: demographic situation.

About 5 million people live in the Central African Republic. About 740 000 people live in its capital city, Bangui. Interestingly, about 40% of the population is between 0 and 14 years old.

The CAR consists of a number of ethnic groups: Baya 33%, Banda 27%, Mandjia 13%, Sara 10%, Mboum 7%, M'Baka 4%, Yakoma 4% and 2% other. The country suffers from various problems: 5% of adults are

diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, 50% of children aged between 5 and 14 years are exposed to child labour, and 28% of the children aged under 5 years old are undernourished.

Economic situation

The CAR is classified as one of the world's least developed countries: it has a vulnerable economy. The economy leans on subsistence agriculture, forestry and the mining industry. Cotton, coffee, tobacco, cassava, yams, corn and bananas are the CAR's agricultural products. The CAR's main export products include diamonds, timber, cotton and coffee. Belgium is largest export country of the CAR, followed by China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia and France. The CAR mainly imports food, textiles, petroleum, machinery, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. The Netherlands is the largest import country, followed by France, Cameroon and South Korea. Substantial constraints on the CAR's economy include its landlocked position, poor transportation infrastructure and a largely uneducated working class. Furthermore, the distribution of income is extremely unequal.⁴

⁴ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), *The World Factbook*, s.d. (26.09.2014, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html>).

Political situation

The CAR is sometimes referred to as a failed state. Currently, however, it has an operational transitional government, headed by President Catherine Samba-Panza and Prime Minister Mahamat Kamoun.⁵ Leading up to the establishment of the transitional government, the country faced successive coups d'état. In 2003, François Bozizé came into power by coup, although he organized and won elections afterwards. In March 2013, Bozizé was forced out of power by Michel Djotodia, who suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament. After several spurs by regional leaders, Djotodia resigned in January 2014. Shortly afterwards, a 135-member national transitional council elected the first female President of the CAR, Samba-Panza, as interim President. She is tasked with organising free elections by the end of 2014.

Executive power in the CAR is exercised by the government, while the legislative power is exercised by both the government and the parliament. The Council of Ministers, which is presided over by the president of the CAR, initiates legislation and controls government operations. A presidential term lasts for six years, and the National Assembly is elected for a five year term. The CAR has a multi-party system, consisting of quite a number of political parties. Currently there are (approximately) twelve parties, amongst which, the National Convergence “Kwa Na Kwa”, which is a group of parties supporting François Boizizé, the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People, the Central African Democratic Rally, the Social Democratic Party and the Löndö Association.

The transitional government has received considerable criticism. Samba-Panza's government is struggling to govern the country since it lacks security forces as well as financial means. Regional international organizations and the United Nations have made attempts to support the Central Africans in building a democracy through the process of dialogue.⁶

Religious divide in the Central African Republic

In essence, the current conflict in the CAR (2012-present) did not arise out of the religious divide in the country. However, it has enforced certain existing tensions in such a manner that currently, the conflict is generally perceived as one between the Muslim Séléka rebels and the predominantly Christian anti-Balaka forces. Whereas the majority of the Central Africans are Christian, only 15% identifies him- or herself as Muslim. Sectarian fighting does not only target members of certain religious groups, but also suppliers of food or medicines (report S/2014/562).

The Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC), a private research network, has published several statements and facts which provide evidence of sectarian violence. Anti-

⁵ EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS), *Déclaration Du Porte-parole Sur la Formation d'un Nouveau Gouvernement en République Centrafricaine*, Brussel, EEAS, 2014. (28.08.2014, EEAS, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140825_01_fr.pdf).

⁶ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), *The World Factbook*, s.d. (26.09.2014, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html>).

Balaka burned mosques and the house of a local imam, while ex-Séléka looted Christian homes. A survivor of an Anti-Balaka attack declared:

*"The anti-machete [fighters] came and got us all off, then they told the Muslims to stand to one side. They threw me into the bush but I watched them kill the men," Umani says. "They slit all seven of their throats. We had to bury them ourselves."*⁷

Reducing the conflict to a merely religious conflict would however be too simplistic. First, Séléka does not solely comprise Muslims, but also includes many non-religious rebels and bandits. Second, the different rebel groups have committed atrocities that were driven by non-religious motivations. Séléka have attacked Muslim communities, while anti-Balaka fighters are said to have been driven by vengeance due to relatives that have been killed by Séléka forces and not necessarily by hate towards Muslims. Third, anti-Balaka is not perceived as representing all Christian communities in the CAR.⁸

THE CONFLICT IN THE CAR

Historical background

The **current conflict** is an offset of the Bush war, leaving the situation in the CAR precarious. When independence was declared in 1960, the former French colony of Ubangi-Shari was renamed the Central African Republic. Barthélémy Boganda became the country's first Prime Minister. Since its independence, the CAR has been an destabilized country, that had to deal with a diverse range of governance problems. The first multi-party democratic elections were only organized in 1993 and most of the elections that followed have been deemed fraudulent. In 2003, following François Bozizé's rise to power, a rebellion was organized by the 'Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)' (of which Michel Djotodia was one of the founders) and other rebel groups, such as the People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy (CAR) (APRD) and, the Union of Republican Forces (UFR). The fighting that followed marked the start of the CAR Bush War (2004-2007): a civil war between UFDR rebels and government forces. When the situation escalated, Bozizé even requested French military troops to intervene. Between 2007 and 2012 a number of peace agreements were signed. The agreements contributed to the stabilization of the country. Despite these efforts, a new Séléka rebel alliance marched South and ousted François Bozizé. They took control of the Bangui in March 2013.⁹

Causes of the conflict

⁷ TERRORISM RESEARCH & ANALYSIS CONSORTIUM (TRAC), *Anti-Balaka*, 2014. (04.09.2014, TRAC, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/anti-balaka>).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ EBERHARD, M. R., *International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) Crisis in the Central African Republic*, s.d. (14.09.2014, ICRtoP, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-the-central-african-republic>).

The causes of the conflict are not to be solely due to the society's religious diversity and political instability. The root causes of the conflict seem to be: (i) the structural inequality between North, which is mainly Muslim, and South, which is mainly Christian; and (ii) the unequal distribution of resources, which are of interest to neighbouring countries too.

Inequality in the CAR

Chilean President Michelle Bachelet stated at the general debate of the sixty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly that "Inequality is one of the greatest threats to development and international security, because it fosters poverty, exclusion and breeds social unrest, resentment and violence".¹⁰ The CAR deals with an extremely high level of inequality, especially between two religious groups. The Muslim minority, which lives in the North, feels discriminated against by the government. From their point of view, the government has realised less in terms of, amongst others, road infrastructure and schools, in comparison with the South.

Furthermore, the two concerned groups have a different sense of identity, which has led to polarization. The North feels more connected with its neighbouring country Sudan, than with its capital city Bangui. The fact that the North identifies less with the CAR has several causes. First and foremost, the Muslims from the North were never able to obtain high ranked positions within the CAR government. Secondly, government investment has been lacking in the North, resulting in poor infrastructure, a lack of schools, roads and hospitals. Northerners are generally poorer than their Southern fellow citizens. This inequality resulted in a sense of dissatisfaction and an excellent breeding ground for rebel movements and their aggressive recruitment tactics. Thirdly, and in opposition, Southerners believe the country has been exploited by foreign powers. Many of the Séléka rebels indeed originate from neighbouring countries.

Research conducted by Louisa Nicalaysen Lombard¹¹, anthropologist at the Duke University, has confirmed the intense level of inequality. In 2010 she categorized the reasons for rebels in the North to join the forces as follows: (1) they are poor (2) the government troops of Bozizé had attacked their villages, (3) "the state had abandoned them, and they wanted to wake it up so it would care for them like a state should".¹²

Scientific data also confirm the CAR's inequality. Research initiated by the World Bank confirms that the CAR is one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country ranks 179 out of 187 countries on the 2011 Human Development Index. The incidence of poverty is 67.2% (2003). Life expectancy was estimated at 48.4 years in 2011, about ten years

¹⁰ X, *Leaders from Latin America, Caribbean Region Urge Action to Increase Inequality, Spur Development*, 24.09.2014. (25.09.2014, UN News Centre, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsId=48819#.VDEH_Bas9-x).

¹¹ In 2012 she obtained her doctorate at the department of cultural anthropology at Duke University. Her doctorate was titled: "*Raiding sovereignty in Central African Borderlands*".

¹² LOMBARD, L. N., *Raiding Sovereignty in Central African Borderlands*, Durham, Duke University, 2012 (Diss. Lic.), pp. 341-350.

below the African average. The vast majority of the Central African Republic's population lacks access to even basic infrastructure, and low service levels are exacerbated by poor maintenance of existing infrastructure. The CAR scores 56,3 on the GINI coefficient. The score 0 represents a perfect equal distribution of income, while the score 100 represents a perfect unequal distribution. About 80% of the population lives with less than 2 USD a day. By contrast, the top 10% of the richest population group of the CAR possesses 46,13% of the total income.


A war for resources?

In addition to the structural inequalities, the current conflict revolves around the distribution of resources. The interest in the CAR's resources concerns both the international level (given the interest of foreign powers and neighbouring countries) and the national level (whereas both the Séléka and the anti-Balaka both claim the CAR's resources such as oil, uranium, diamond, ivory and wood).

The oil basin are shown on geographical map 3.

Central African Republic Crisis, 2013 to 2014

A map developed by DigitalGlobe imagery analysts provides an overview of locations where Anti-Balaka and Séléka forces operate relative to areas with poaching and natural resources.



Source: DigitalGlobe/Adrianna Valenti and Joe Ulrich; U.S. Geological Survey; International Peace Information Service; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, or ACLED; Simba Energy Inc.; and ERHC Energy Inc.

MAP 3

Bron: AGGER, K., *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic*, Enough!, 2014, pp. 1-20. (17.09.2014, The Enough Project, <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf>).

Chad and France are among the countries named that have an established interest in the CAR's oil reserve. Chad has expressed interest in operating in the Doseo and Salamat basins which cut across the borders of Chad and the CAR. Until now, no agreement has been signed between these two countries concerning these oil wells.



Cartoonist: © Lattuf 2014 - Operamundi

In the past, a number of other countries have extracted oil from the CAR. China, the US and South Africa all concluded exploitation rights. Changes in government have not necessarily been harmful for foreign powers since, in practice, it has increased their successes in negotiating contracts, allowing them to invest in the country.

In addition to oil, the CAR is home to some of the

world's richest diamond mines. Séléka rebels control most regions that contain diamonds. As

such, they have been able to set up an illegal trade in diamonds allowing them to purchase arms (as well as food, fuel and transport means). The local population has been included in their forced mining schemes. Corruption substantially taints their attempts to control the mine sector and the bribery of the military personnel of the Chadian and Sudanese government has been widespread. Illegally traded diamonds has furthermore reached the DRC and Cameroon. The CAR was suspended from the Kimberley Process, which prevents countries from buying conflict diamonds and it is estimated that conflict diamonds from the CAR are still entering foreign markets. Interestingly, Séléka Commander Hissene spent several years trading diamonds in 'the world's capital of diamonds': Antwerp.

Séléka rebels furthermore have been accused of trading in elephant ivory. Here too, close cooperation with Sudanese and Chadian actors has been crucial. Local park rangers have testified to the slaughtering of elephants by Séléka and the killing of park rangers. It is likely that the ivory is traded to Sudan and the Asian market.

The extent to which the anti-Balaka rebels are involved in illegal mining is still unclear. Séléka rebels and its allies do face threats by anti-Balaka militia. Crimes committed by anti-Balaka include looting in resource-rich areas and diamond shops. They control a number of gold mines and are based in diamond-rich areas.¹³

AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Overview of peacekeeping operations

Since the start of the conflict, there have been several attempts by the international community to find peaceful solutions, stop the fighting, protect civilians and offer humanitarian aid. The UN, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the European Union (EU) and France have been involved in such

¹³ AGGER, K. *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic, Enough!*, 2014, pp. 1-20. (17.09.2014, The Enough Project, <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf>).

attempts and peacekeeping operations have been launched. What follows is a chronological overview of these operations.

In October 2002, the Multinational Force of Central Africa (**FOMAC**) was created by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (**CEMAC**). The non-permanent force brings together military personnel from a number of Central African States. Its goal was to consolidate peace and security and to provide humanitarian aid. In 2008 the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (**MICOPAX**) officially replaced the FOMAC. It operates under the authority of ECCAS.

In 2010, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (**BINUCA**) was created. Its main task was to consolidate peace and strengthen the CAR's democratic institutions. In 2013, the UN strengthened its mandate in five areas: support for the implementation of the transition process, support for conflict prevention and humanitarian aid, support for the stabilization of the security situation, the promotion and protection of human rights and the coordination of international actors involved in the implementation of these tasks.

In May 2013, the former Prime Minister of the CAR, Nicolas Tiangaye, requested the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to establish a peacekeeping operation.

The security situation significantly worsened between June and August 2013. In this period international organizations, such as UNHCR reported 200 000 internally displaced persons and violations of human rights (amongst which practices such as the use of child soldiers, torture, rape, executions and disappearances).

The President of France, François Hollande, also addressed the UNSC and the African Union to increase efforts to stabilize the CAR. In August the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (**AFISM-CAR**)¹⁴ took over the tasks of MICOPAX, and operated under the authority of the African Union.

In reaction to the further escalation of violence, the UNSC in **Resolution 2127** authorized the establishment of an International Support Mission to the CAR (**MISCA**), led by the African Union (S/RES/2127).¹⁵ MISCA took over the tasks of FOMAC, MICOPAX and AFISM-CAR.¹⁶ The EU contributed financially to MISCA. UNSC Resolution 2127 also approved the establishment of a French intervention force, *operation Sangaris*. Both missions were highly necessary albeit unsuccessful due the complexities in the CAR. Additionally, it was established that troops were understaffed and lacked the necessary means. Furthermore, the large scale and intensity of the violence was severely underestimated. Hence, although they

¹⁴ AFRICAN UNION, *Launch of the Transmission from MICOPAX to the African-Led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic*, 01.08.2013. (25.08.2014, AFRICAN UNION, <http://www.au.int/en/content/launch-transition-micopax-african-led-international-support-mission-central-african-republic>).

¹⁵ X, UNSC Resolution 2127 (2013) (S/RES/2127) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7072nd meeting, on 5 December 2013, pp. 1-12.

¹⁶ AFRICAN UNION, o.c.

had some positive effects, the operations were not able to stop the ongoing human rights violations.¹⁷

On 28 January 2014 the UNSC adopted **Resolution 2134** (S/RES/2134).¹⁸ This resolution extended BINUCA's mandate and explicitly authorized the European Union to deploy a military operation to the CAR. The EU used this mandate to develop its operation **EUFOR RCA**.

In response to the violence, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, proposed a six-point initiative. In the initiative he called for more troops, coordination, logistical and financial support, support to the CAR government, capacity building of the CAR government, a political process that could lead to reconciliation and increased funding for humanitarian action.¹⁹ The humanitarian, political and socio-economic situation in the CAR was outlined in a report published in March and directed to the UNSC. It also provided an overview of the international and regional responses towards the conflict and extensively elaborated upon the rule of law.²⁰ Based on the findings, Ban Ki-Moon suggested to the Security Council to act conform Chapter VII and develop a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation with a priority to protect civilians.

The 10th of April 2014, a final Resolution with respect to the CAR was adopted: **UNSC Resolution 2149** (S/RES/2149).²¹ It established the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeeping operation in adherence to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. BINUCA will be subsumed in this operation.²²

The 15th of June 2014, the EU started its military operation EUFOR RCA. The goal of this operation is to temporarily support the main Capital, Bangui, in increasing security and facilitating humanitarian aid. This operation comprises 700 military personnel and is mandated for a period of 4 to 6 months.²³

By mid-July, both Séléka and anti-Balaka agreed to a ceasefire for at least one year, after the intervention of regional mediators. However, it was not respected for a long period.

¹⁷ DUCROTTE, F., *EU Mission in the Central African Republic – EUFOR CAR Bangui (Part III)*, s.d. (20.09.2014, Issues of International and European Security (ISIS), <http://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2014/04/11/eu-mission-to-the-central-african-republic-eufor-car-bangui-part-iii/>).

¹⁸ X, UNSC Resolution 2134 (2014) (S/RES/2134) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7103rd meeting, on 28 January 2014, pp. 1-11.

¹⁹ X, *Latest Statements: New York, 20 February 2014 – Secretary General's Remark to the Security Council on the Situation in the Central African Republic*, 20.02.2014. (15.09.2014, United Nations Secretary General, <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7471>).

²⁰ X, UNSC Report (S/2014/142) of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013), 3 March 2014, pp. 1-24.

²¹ X, *Security Council Authorizes United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic*, 10.04.2014. (20.09.2014, United Nations Meeting Coverages and Press Releases, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11349.doc.htm>).

²² X, UNSC Resolution 2149 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7153rd meeting, on 10 April 2014, pp. 1-14.

²³ EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, *European Union – EEAS (European External Action Service) EUFOR RCA*, 2.10.2014. (07.10.2014, European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rca/index_en.htm).

Infringement were reported by the spokesperson of the Séléka rebels who claimed to be attacked by Christian anti-Balaka militia.

The transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA took place on 15 September 2014.²⁴ The operation comprises 10 000 military personnel and 1800 police personnel. Its main priorities are to:

- “Protect civilians
- Support for the implementation of the transition process
- Facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance
- Protect the UN
- Promote and protect human rights
- Support national and international justice and the rule of law
- Disarm, Demobilise, Reintegrate (DDR) and Repatriate (DDRR)”²⁵.

Regional responses

The CAR’s neighbouring countries have always been economically and politically interested in the CAR, which has also contributed to its destabilisation.²⁶ The CAR conflict impacts the economy of its neighbouring countries and the entire region. Therefore it is in the region’s own interest to stabilise the CAR.

The UNSC often refers to the role and importance of regional and sub-regional organizations with regard to the reconciliation process in the aforementioned resolutions. The UN stresses amongst others the importance of regional cooperation and coordination, the presence of regional organizations, the use of its reconciliation mechanisms and the potential impact of the CAR conflict on the whole region. ECCAS, the African Union and the EU are the most important regional organizations with respect to the CAR.

The sub-region, which was under ECCAS’s leadership, remained very actively engaged in responding and finding a solution for the crisis. Main actors in this process were the President of Chad and the Chair of ECCAS, Idriss Déby Itno and the President of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, who had a mediator role (Report S/2014/562).²⁷ Idriss Déby sent 2000 troops to the CAR. However, these Chadian troops were accused of siding with the Muslim community. The foregoing has consistently been denied and in reaction to the concerned allegations, they

²⁴ UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILISATION MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, *MINUSCA Background*, 09.10.2014. (09.10.2014, United Nations, <http://minusca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5785&language=en-US>).

²⁵ UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILISATION MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, *MINUSCA Mandate*, 09.10.2014. (09.10.2014, United Nations, <http://minusca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5728&language=en-US>).

²⁶ AGGER, K., *Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic*, Enough!, 2014, pp. 1-20. (17.09.2014, The Enough project: <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CAR%20Report%20-%20Behind%20the%20Headlines%205.1.14.pdf>).

²⁷ X, UNSC Report (S/2014/562) of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic, 1 August 2014, pp. 1-18.

withdrew their troops in April 2014.²⁸ Consequently, troops from Gabon, Chad, Cameroon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea entered the CAR under the FOMAC peacekeeping operation. The government of Uganda declared war with respect to the Séléka rebels as they accuse Séléka of having ties with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). More specifically, it is alleged that Séléka provides the LRA with food and medicine.

Chapter VIII UN Charter (article 52-54)

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides an international legal basis for the involvement of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. To maintain international peace is the primary responsibility of the UNSC. It encourages the involvement of regional organizations in resolving conflicts. The UNSC serves as a final mediator and conflict must initially be resolved between countries bilaterally or through regional organizations. However, authorization of the UNSC is required if an actor wants to use enforcement action.

Within this context, the UNSC has established a number of cooperation mechanisms. Regional organizations are also important for conducting negotiations with leaders from conflict regions. A number of regional organizations have established peacekeeping operations in the CAR, namely, as aforementioned, ECCAS, the AU and the EU.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The unrest has displaced tens of thousands of Central Africans. Many of them have crossed the border into Chad. Two and a half million people are in dire need of humanitarian aid. 45% of the population face undernourishment (report/S/2014/562).²⁹ Thousands of people have died and a million fled the country. This equals one fifth of the CAR population. The aforementioned events have resulted in 400 000 internally displaced persons. Most of the CAR refugees, 220 000 in total, have fled to Chad, the DRC, the Republic Congo and Cameroon.³⁰ In August 2014 some 100 000 new Central African refugees have been reported in the CAR.

These numbers indicate the irrefutable severity of the situation. The UN Refugee Chief recently warned against the neglect of acknowledgment with respect to the humanitarian crisis in Africa in general.³¹ In doing so, he also referred to the crisis in the Central African

²⁸ X, *Chad Withdraws all Troops from CAR*, 17.04.2014. (02.09.2014, Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/chad-withdraws-all-troops-from-car-201441743819156703.html>).

²⁹ X, UNSC Report (S/2014/562) of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic, 1 August 2014, pp. 1-18.

³⁰ UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), *UNHCR Central African Republic*, 2014, (10.09.2014, UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c156.html>).

³¹ UN News Centre, *UN Refugee Chief Warns Against Overlooking Humanitarian Crises in Africa*, 29.09.2014. (05.09.2014, UN News Centre, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48939#.VCnD8xas9-w>).

Republic. Many referred to the conflict as ‘the forgotten conflict’. It must however be noted that some humanitarian organisations had to scale down or temporarily suspend their activities due to the precarious situation in the country.

The security situation in the CAR is alarming. The CAR government estimated that in 2014 45% of the population suffered from sexual violence. Women and girls are the primary victims in this respect. These crimes include, amongst others, rape, forced marriage, sexual slavery and sexual mutilation. Children’s rights are continuously violated.³²

Furthermore, the aforementioned instability might attract terrorist groups from its surrounding countries. The presence of the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram has already been reported.³³ The latter might lead to a vicious circle as the presence of terrorists can ultimately result in a further destabilization. It needs to be noted that this does not only apply to the CAR, but, equally so, to the entire Central African region.

Some define the Séléka and anti-Balaka as terrorists groups, although there seems to be no consensus on this matter. On one hand some claim both groups to be terrorist groups. The African Union for example accused the anti-Balaka of being terrorists following the murder of a peacekeeper.³⁴ Both the anti-Balaka and Séléka coalition are included on the list of terrorist groups which is developed by the ‘Terrorism research & analysis consortium (TRAC).’³⁵ On the other hand, both groups are not defined as terrorists by the national counterterrorism centre of the United States.³⁶

Séléka rebels accused François Bozizé of crimes against humanity and incitement to genocide. As a reaction the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened a formal investigation for crimes committed by both Séléka and anti-Balaka. It is however very reasonable that both groups have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.³⁷ During September 2014, the responsible ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, opened a second investigation with respect to the crimes committed since 2012. According to Bensouda “the list of atrocities is endless. War crimes include murder, rape, forced displacement, persecution, pillaging, attacks against humanitarian missions and the use of children under 15 in combat.”³⁸ Illegal weapons also proliferate across the CAR.

³² X, UNSC Report (S/2014/562) of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic, 1 August 2014, pp. 1-18.

³³ MCNEISH, H., *Lawless CAR Attracting Terrorists’ Attention*, 22.11.2013. (01.10.2014, Voice of America, <http://www.voanews.com/content/lawless-car-attracting-terrorists-attention/1795564.html>).

³⁴ FELIX, B., LEWIS, D., & LAWRENCE, J., *AU Brands Central African Republic Militia ‘Terrorists’ After Peacekeeper Killed*, 25.03.2014. (28.09.2014, Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/25/us-centralafrica-afro-idUSBREA201XR20140325>).

³⁵ TERRORISM RESEARCH & ANALYSIS CONSORTIUM (TRAC), *Groups – List TRAC*, 2014 (18.09.2014, TRAC, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/groups/list?start=S>).

³⁶ THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC), *NCTC. Gov 2014 Counterterrorism Calendar*, 2014. (22.09.2014, NCTC, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html>).

³⁷ X, *ICC to Probe Possible War Crimes in CAR*, 25.09.2014. (21.09.2014, Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/icc-probe-possible-war-crimes-car-201492552945705748.html>).

³⁸ X, *International Criminal Court Opens Second Probe Into Central African Republic Violence*, 24.09.2014. (26.09.2014, UN News Centre, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsId=48811#.VC8CJhas9-x>).

THE ROLE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THIS CASE

These developments irrefutably warrant an international response. Therefore, the UNSC is assembled for an emergency session on the topic ‘Towards a solution for the conflict and humanitarian crisis in the CAR?’. This session will be held from 28-30 November 2014 in Brussels. The following questions are on the agenda:

- 1) *How to end the violence inspired by sectarianism in the CAR?* The international community has high hopes that the MINUSCA peacekeeping force will be successful in ending violence, disarming combatants, protecting civilians and restoring peace in CAR, but is the current mandate sufficiently clear and broad to meet those expectations? Since inequality seems to be the underlying cause of the ongoing, nation-wide, violence, what is the role of the UNSC in preventing the conflict from escalating yet again following a period of relative stability? How can the disarmament of various actors be realized?
- 2) *What is the international community’s role in ending the ‘war for resources’ in the CAR?* Natural resources have played a conspicuous role in the history of the conflict in the CAR: the dependence of local belligerents upon mobilising private sources to sustain their military and political activities has resulted in exploitation of the resource sector by foreign firms. What is the role of foreign governments in preventing exploitation by businesses and investors?
- 3) *What additional measures can be taken by regional, international, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations to improve the situation on the ground?*
- 4) *The mounting humanitarian crisis calls for an international response: what measures should be adopted within this context?* How can the international community alleviate the CAR’s refugee crisis, which affects neighbouring States and other countries of destination? Do urgent humanitarian problems call for more urgent answers? The UNSC should not limit itself to words, but may also consider concrete actions, commitments, money, support for humanitarian organisations, etc. Could ‘safe havens’ be a solution? What about overflight rights, logistics, personnel, etc.? What is the time table?

These questions can be connected. Regional actors can, by means of an example, take humanitarian action. Hopefully the emergency session can lead to a common answer from the international community. A Plenary Session will give each of the member-countries of the UNSC an opportunity to influence the course of current international politics. Some other countries will additionally be invited by the 15 to have a say, although they will themselves not be deciding parties. Each student will act as the ambassador of the country or organisation they represent at the UNSC. Be aware, however, that negotiations constitute a dynamic process; it will be up to you to defend the interests of your country/delegation! You and only you will be answerable for your actions to your own Government upon returning to your Capital.

Thus, much is at stake... It will therefore prove crucial that you reflect in advance about the strategy you will follow during the deliberations. For this purpose, you will be asked to write a position paper in preparation of the Emergency Meeting. The position papers will be

officially distributed in advance. The strategy papers however should be considered top secret material which can only circulate within and not between delegations.

It is very likely that the UNSC will move from a formal setting to an informal setting during its deliberations. This is called '*caucusing*', a setting which can be suggested by one or more of the delegations. There are two forms of '*caucusing*'; moderated and unmoderated. Both are informal ways of negotiating. The difference can be stated quite simply; (1) a '*moderated caucus*' is led by the presidency around the negotiating table, (2) an '*unmoderated caucus*' can be seen as an interaction between delegations away from the negotiating table (the presidency thus has no role to play in an '*unmoderated caucus*').

When you return to a formal setting, be aware that a resolution is adopted if 9 out of 15 votes are in favour and if there is no veto. Any amendments will be voted upon before the resolution has become final. In procedural matters, a veto cannot be used. The presidency calls the meeting to order and as it proposed this emergency session of the Council, he/she will speak up first. After this opening address the permanent members will take the floor, followed-up by the non-permanent members.

The final goal of the negotiations should be the drafting of a UNSC resolution. If this would ultimately prove politically and/or technically unattainable, the negotiating parties can draw up statements, on their own or as a group. If a resolution is attainable, the negotiating parties can also issue explanatory statements. *Last but not least*, if certain countries were to agree upon separate 'secret' deals during the Emergence Session in Brussels, the parties involved will be asked to disclose the content of their arrangements during the evaluation after the negotiations, so that a full *group-evaluation* of the political process can be made, with all cards on the table. A final piece of advice; be aware that the negotiations can also be affected



by 'new developments on the ground'. You must therefore '*be prepared for anything*'.

The Emergency Session of the UNSC (VVN MUN) on the topic 'Towards a solution for the conflict and humanitarian crisis in the CAR?' will convene in Brussels.

The UNSC consists of five permanent members (the so-called "P-5", with veto powers); **the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.**

Furthermore, the UNSC consists of an additional ten non-permanent members; currently Argentina (2014), Australia (2014), Chad (2015), Chile (2015), Jordan (2015), Lithuania (2015), Luxembourg (2014), Nigeria (2015), Republic of Korea (2014) and Rwanda (2014).

In addition, a number of delegations will also be invited to the work of the Security Council during the negotiations. The African Union and the European Union will be both regional organisations attending. Furthermore delegates from the following countries will be invited: The Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Sudan. Other invited organisations are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Be aware that these invited delegations can be a source of advice and/or exert informal pressure on the negotiations. However, they do not have any voting powers in the UNSC.

At the end of the day, it will thus be upon the 15 to (try to) decide upon an international course of action to safeguard peace and stability. The presidency of the Security Council will be observed by a number of professors, together with 2 vice-presidents (assistants).

The distribution of the delegations among the different Flemish universities is as follows

VUB	UA	KU Leuven	UGent
The United Kingdom	The United States	China	France
Russia	Argentina (2014)	Australia (2014)	Chile (2015)
Lithuania (2015)	Luxembourg (2014)	Jordan (2015)	Republic of Korea (2014)
Central African Republic	Chad (2015)	Nigeria (2015)	Rwanda (2014)
Cameroon	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	European Union	African Union
Human Rights Watch (HRW)	The Democratic Republic of Congo	Sudan	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Good luck!

ANNEX

Contributions of regional organizations to the CAR

ECCAS:

- lead the MICOPAX operation
- send troops of the FOMAC mission to continue support for the MICOPAX mission

AU:

- Suspended membership of the CAR in March 2013, meaning that the CAR cannot participate activities of the AU
- the AU didn't accept Michel Djotodia as President of the CAR
- transition of MICOPAX to AFISM-CAR
- leads the peacekeeping mission of the African Union (MISCA)

EU:

- contributes a financial distribution for the MISCA troops
- started a peacekeeping mission: EUFOR RCA.
- Relevant EU decisions:
 - Council Decision 2014/73/CFSP of 10 February 2014 on a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), Official Journal of the European Union 2014, L 40, pp. 59-61.
 - Council Decision 2014/181/CFSP of 10 March 2014 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Central African Republic on the status in the Central African Republic of the European Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), Official Journal of the European Union 2014, L 98, pp.1-2.
 - Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and the Central African Republic on the status in the Central African Republic of the European Union military operation in the Central African republic (EUFOR RCA), Official Journal of the European Union 2014, L 98, pp.3-4.

Application of chapter VIII: a few examples

- There has been a consultation between the UN and ECCAS, as well as between the AU and the others.

“The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 2121 (2013), by which the Council requested me to submit, in close consultation with the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and interested bilateral partners and international organizations, a written report on the planning of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) with detailed options for international support to MISCA, including the possible option of transforming it into a United Nations peacekeeping operation, subject to appropriate conditions on the ground.”³⁹

- Authorization is need from the UNSC

“Welcoming the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 19 July 2013 to authorize the deployment of the “ African-led International Support Mission in the CAR” (referred to hereafter as MISCA), as well as the conclusions reached by the AU and the ECCAS regarding the modalities of the transition from MICOPAX to MISCA following the consultative meeting held in Addis Ababa on 2 and 3 September 2013”⁴⁰

“Mandate for the European Union operation in the CAR :Authorizes the European Union to deploy an operation in the CAR as referenced in the letter dated 21 January 2014 from the High Representative of the European Union”⁴¹

- ECCAS and the AU encourage action and cooperation

“encourages the AU and the ECCAS, building on their previous consultations, to expedite their efforts towards the effective transition from MICOPAX to MISCA, and requests in this regard the Secretary-General and BINUCA to establish appropriate cooperation mechanisms with the ECCAS and the AU in order to facilitate this process;”⁴²

³⁹ X, UNSC Report (S/2013/677) of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 2121, 15 November 2013, pp. 1-13.

⁴⁰ X, UNSC Resolution 2127 (2013) (S/RES/2127) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7072nd meeting, on 5 December 2013, pp. 1-12.

⁴¹ X, UNSC Resolution 2134 (2014) (S/RES/2134) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7103rd meeting , on 28 January 2014, pp. 1-11.

⁴² X, *Security Council Expresses Readiness to Consider ‘Appropriate Measures’ against Those Fuelling Violence in Central African Republic*, 10.10.2013. (21.09.2014, UN Meeting Coverage & Press Releases, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11144.doc.htm>).

CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

NOV 2012	A coalition of new Séléka rebels wins over the north and the center of the country.
JAN 2013	11/01/2013: An agreement is accomplished on a ceasefire
MAR 2013	24/03/2013: Ceasefire is disrupted. Conquest of the Capital of Bangui +President Bozizé on the run by coup of Michel Djotodia. He decomposes the parliament.
AUG 2013	Michel Djotodia is appointed as President.
SEPT 2013	Djotodia decomposes the Séléka coalition
OCT 2013	UNSC adopts resolution that gives mandate for UN peacekeeping force to support troops of the African Union and France.
NOV 2013	UNSC condemns war crimes committed by Lord's Resistance Army (Ugandan Army) in resolution S/RES/2126 (2013) and UN warns for genocide
DEC 2013	Famine + resolution S/RES/2127 (2013) adopted to give UN peacekeeping force -the mandate to suppress the violence.
JAN 2014	President Djotodia resigns and Catherine Samba-Panza takes over leadership on a temporary base.
FEB 2014	10.02.2014: the council of the European Union establishes EUFOR RCA, a military operation in the Car.
MAR 2014	France accuses the EU of shirking of responsibility after failure of a EU plan to send troops.
APR 2014	UNSC adopts resolution by which authorization is given to 12000 peacekeepers
MAY 2014	EU troops take care of securing the airport of Bangui.